

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SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND THE CIVILIAN WAR EFFORT

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A. THE WAR SERVICE COMMITTEE OF *SPSSI*

Wartime is a poor time for perspective. Reports of progress coming from midstream are tentative and not always accurate. Yet, in establishing its War Service Committee, the members of *SPSSI* undoubtedly hoped that this Committee would find itself able to make some statement concerning the contribution that social psychology is making toward the winning of the war.

The history and composition of the Committee, established in September, 1942, are described elsewhere (10). To state in detail the activities of each of its subcommittees is not necessary, for like so much of the work of specialists at the present time, their efforts converge, without individual glory, toward a common end. Certain portions of the following survey, however, have been prepared by Chairmen of the various subcommittees.

Our report takes the form of a review of total progress, so far as this progress can be discerned without the aid of temporal perspective. In preparing it we have labored under two unavoidable handicaps. (*a*) We have had virtually no access to government reports or to the current work of social psychologists now employed by the armed forces, *OSS, OWI, FBIS,* or by other branches of the government. (*b*) We have confined ourselves almost entirely to work initiated after the state of national emergency was recognized in 1940. It was in the early fall of that year that social psychologists (and the nation as a whole) first commenced to mobilize for the struggle to come. Inevitably the recency of this work makes complete coverage and accurate evaluation impossible.

Yet the review, we hope, will justify itself by acquainting social psychologists with the work of others who are engaged in activities similar to their own. Especially valuable perhaps are our citations of unpublished researches which might otherwise never come to light.

Readers will discover where gaps exist in current knowledge, and will perhaps be encouraged to enter neglected fields of study, so that our common efforts may more readily accumulate toward our common goal.

The materials covered in this survey fall under the following principal divisions which serve as our table of contents, and at the same time specify the areas in which social psychologists have been most active: Morale and Its Measurement, Civilian Intelligence Work, Minorities, Rumor, Morale Building and Leadership, Media of Communication, Propaganda, Comparative National Psychology, Industrial Morale, Essentials for Normal Living, Demoralization, Children in Wartime, Postwar Planning.

1. *Morale and its Measurement*[1]

a. Definition. Even at the outset of the present emergency a wide variety of definitions of morale were available for use. The trend of these definitions was summarized in a report of a special committee on psychological factors in morale, of the National Research Council, which met in Washington in November, 1940 (213). More recently an objective and operational conception seems to have come into favor. Morale is regarded as a psychological factor which *makes a difference* in the success or failure of an enterprise, where other factors are held constant (118). On the basis of this definition we are encouraged to seek those attitudes that are demonstrably related to effective participation in the war effort.

b. Agencies concerned with morale. Among the government organizations essentially concerned with studying morale are the following: Office of War Information; Division of Program Surveys, U. S. Department of Agriculture; Special Services Division, War Department. But many private groups have been equally active; witness such publications as the following: *Civilian Morale,* a yearbook of the *SPSSI* (292), *German Psychological Warfare,* by the Committee for National Morale (94), *Psychology for the Fighting Man,* prepared for the *NRC* (212), *Worksheets on Morale,* from the Harvard Seminar in Psychological Problems of Morale

[1]Prepared with the aid of A. R. Gilliland, Chairman of Subcommittee on Morale Measurement.

(122); summaries of the Gallup and Fortune polls as found in the *Public Opinion Quarterly* (219); reports of the National Opinion Research Center (208, 209, 210, 211), and of the Office of Public Opinion Research (219, 220); symposia such as found in special issues of the *Journal of Educational Sociology* (234), the *American Journal of Sociology* (11), *the Psychological Bulletin* (226), and *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences* (17). A more complete bibliography of the early literature prior to 1941 is presented by Child (63).

c. Early work in morale measurement. The first work in the measurement of morale in this country seems to have been conducted by Hall (116). In his investigation Hall studied the characteristics of a group of unemployed engineers. His scale was of the Thurstone type with scoring as devised by Likert (170). Rundquist and Sletto used a similar technique for the construction of several scales for the measurement of personality changes in the depression (243). One of their scales constructed for the measurement of morale, has had extensive use with the unemployed (62) and with slum dwellers (61). Applying this scale to college graduates, Miller compared the characteristics of the lowest and highest groups of 100 each out of a total of 951 University of Minnesota graduates (195). He found that higher morale was associated with higher income, higher occupational level, greater economic security, marriage, and strong religious convictions (196).

A series of three generalized morale scales has been constructed by Whistler and Remmer (295). The method used had been previously employed by Remmers in his generalized attitude scales (237).

d. Measurement of war attitudes. In the measurement of attitudes more closely related to the war effort, Gilliland and Katzoff constructed a scale for measuring attitudes towards participation in the European conflict (106, 137). This scale was used before Pearl Harbor and showed that attitudes fluctuated markedly in relation to allied successes and reverses. Jones (134) tested 700 Clark University students between 1930 and 1941. From 1930 to 1936 the students' attitudes were mildly pacifistic, seniors being more pacifistic than freshmen. Since 1936 there has been a definite shift away from pacifism. Dudycha found little shift in attitudes of Ripon College students between 1937 and 1940 and little difference between

freshmen and seniors (81). Other background studies of attitudes toward war or pacifism have been made by Farnsworth (95), Gristle (111), Gundlach (112), Koga (146), Miller (197, 198), Pihlblad (224), Porter (225), Raskin and Cook (231), Reed (233), Rogers (239), Smith (262), and Zubin and Gristle (306).

e. Morale of youth. At Cornell a Morale Poll has been drawn up for the purpose of obtaining information on the issues predominant in the minds of college students throughout the country (71). It is planned to repeat the poll annually at the same date. Now available are results on the morale of Cornell students in 1942 and 1943. During the year it was found that the students' expectation for victory increased, at the same time as their belief in the excellence of the fighting record of our allies and their willingness to sacrifice for victory. Fewer students thought that there was bungling by Army and Navy leaders. As for postwar policies, fewer favored an exclusive organization of the democracies, but more wanted a world police force. Sherman had 6500 high-school pupils Chicago write a theme on the topic: "How the war affects me" (257). Five hundred other youths, most of whom were not in school, were interviewed on this same theme. Four persons read the reports, analyzed them, and placed them in one of seven groups with regard to attitude toward the war. Five per cent expressed direct antagonism, six per cent a critical attitude, 21 per cent were confused, nine per cent were mildly favorable, and 26 per cent had a favorable attitude toward the war. Girls were more verbal than boys and expressed stronger tendencies either for or against war.

Cronbach made a survey of the effects of the war on 2000 high-school pupils of the state of Washington (74). These effects were studied in terms of their expression of optimism or pessimism about the outcome of the war and what it would mean to them. A questionnaire was constructed containing 70 items scored on a five point scale. These items were classified by three judges. With a possible range for *general* optimism-pessimism from —98 to +98 the boys' mean score was +7.3 and the girls' +1.10. Their mean *personal* optimism-pessimism, with a possible range of —36 to +36, was +5.4 for boys and +5.6 for girls. Cronbach agrees with other investigators in maintaining that low item-intercorrelations indicate that

morale is not a unit variable but is composed of several relatively independent factors.

A recent study has been made by the Scout Executives in New York and New Jersey to determine the participation behavior of youth (40). Two problems were studied, (*a*) war service and morale, and (*b*) patterns of administration and leadership of youth groups. The study was conducted by interviewing 633 boys and their leaders. It was found that the boys were rendering considerable material aid in such war activities as selling stamps and bonds, collecting paper, rubber, metals, and that they like most those activities which they think make the greatest contribution. For the most part the boys were "told what to do" by their leaders and had little part in the deciding how they could best help. While a majority of the boys were satisfied with such domination it was found that units in which the group decision method was used that the amount of war service accomplishment was equally great.

f. Morale measurement. The present emergency brought a new scale devised by Harding (117), derived in part from the earlier Rundquist-Sletto questionnaire, but designed to measure four principal "components": idealism, realism, confidence and tolerance. Harding attempted to validate his scale against groups of high and low morale. At a later date this author discarded the questionnaire method in favor of the polling method (118, 59). He insisted that morale must be viewed as "the set of those social attitudes which *make a difference* to the degree of an individual's participation in the war effort," and undertook to validate his test-questions against the respondent's answers to certain questions regarding participation in the war effort. The test-questions were designed to measure 16 "components" of morale postulated by Cantril and Harding. The questionnaire was administered to 2539 persons in March, 1942, and it was found that the following 12 components were valid indices of morale. They are here listed in the order of their correlation with actual participation.

1. Agreement with the objective.
2. War objective attainable.
3. Awareness of the objective.
4. Basic values.
5. Determination to achieve the objective.
6. Confidence in the news.

7. Sense of unity.
8. Awareness of the magnitude of the task.
9. Confidence in the leader.
10. Peace objective attainable.
11. Hatred of the enemy.
12. Confidence in subleaders.

These components show a fairly high intercorrelation, whereas factor analysis reveals three uncorrelated common factors or "dimensions": (*a*) reasoned determination to achieve the objective, (*b*) confidence in leaders, (*c*) satisfaction with traditional values.

The scale was used to measure group differences in morale. Upper income groups were highest with respect to "agreement with the objective" and "satisfaction with traditional values." The lower economic groups were highest in "confidence in leaders."

Mention should be made here of Vernon's study, in Great Britain, which distinguished five attitudinal factors in morale (282, 184): cheerfulness, wishful thinking, anti-socialist attitudes, moralistic attitudes, and retaliatory attitudes. From the intercorrelations among the scales a general factor emerged: optimism and support for the government's policy. High morale correlated also highly with "good citizenship" as measured by participation in civilian war activities.

Although the specificity or generality of morale seems, in part at least, to be a function of the items constituting the numerous scales in this area, it may also be that the longer the war lasts, and the more intense the involvement of civilians, the more generalized are the attitudes.

Gilliland constructed a series of seven Thurstone type scales for the measurement of attitudes toward the war effort, nationalism, Germany, Japan, England, Russia, and War aims and results (105). These scales were administered to students in various colleges. The mean attitude toward Germany ranged from 7.55 to 8.70 for five different groups. A much more unfavorable attitude toward Japan was shown by scores for these groups ranging from 9.4 to 10.4. The intercorrelations between the different scales ranged from .08 to .53 with a mean of .31. This indicated, the author believes, that morale is made up of "many little things" not closely related to each other.

In another study by the same author interviews were secured from

a representative sample of the Chicago area population by means of a house to house canvass. A sample of 156 cases was obtained in the spring of 1943 and 193 cases in the spring of 1943. In general the opinions remained very similar. There was a general tendency for opinions in 1943 to "crystallize," that is, to become fixed at the mode of the 1942 answers. Both studies indicated much confusion in the minds of the persons interviewed as to the aims of the war and the probable consequences of the war. The greatest change from 1942 to 1943 was a shift from 60 per cent who said the Army and Navy were doing a good job in 1942 to 84 per cent who made the same statement in 1943. When different economic groups were compared in 1943, little difference was found on most questions. The greatest difference was found in that the majority of the upper income group thought the most important obstacle to be overcome was "industrial bottlenecks due to poor planning" and "strikes and union interference," whereas the lowest economic group thought it was "lack of materials and trained men."

Through interviews and casual observations Doob recorded the attitudes and opinions of a rural Canadian community (80). He observed how the attitudes towards England's chances of surviving, criticism of the government, scepticism concerning news reports, anxiety about the war, varies as a function of culture and personality differences. Various sources of evidence concerning morale such as letters to the editor, radio listening habits, movie attendance, national polls, war diaries, and case studies are utilized in the assessing of the morale of large urban community (122c). In Great Britain, Mass-Observation has been assessing continuously the reactions of the British people to the war (181, 182). Although severely criticised for its lack of controls and relative disregard of sampling procedures, Mass-Observation played a not unimportant rôle during the darkest period of the war in Britain.

A fairly complete summary of methods for measuring morale is contained in a chapter of the Yearbook of the Littauer School for Public Administration (7).

g. Psychological factors in Morale. Some attempts have been made to secure a more qualitative study of morale. Using Harding's original morale scale (117), Sanford and Conrad (246) attempt to establish certain personality correlates of morale relating

both to group-memberships and to personal characteristics. For instance, students with high academic grades on the average make lower morale scores than do the poorer students; social-science students had more high morale scores than those of other curriculum groups. Country dwellers get lower scores than city dwellers who in turn have somewhat lower scores than small-town dwellers. Catholics make lower scores than Jews. Associated with a low morale score we find student's preference for being born into a socially prominent family, the wish for making a lot of money, and the wish to have a small number of children. In another study, types and causes of apathy and scepticism have been derived from 50 interviews of apathetic and sceptical respondents (122d). Qualitative listings of America's assets and liabilities in morale are presented by G. W. Allport (4, 122h).

2. *Civilian Intelligence Work*

Within the past decade high efficiency has been reached in ascertaining accurately and speedily the state of public opinion. A valuable memorandum on the various methods available for assessing public opinion has been prepared by Ruch (240), and a summary of methods for studying war attitudes by Strang (270). Gallup and Rae summarize the workings of the Gallup Polls (99) and a description of Mass-Observation, the omnibus method used in Britain, is given by Willcock (297).

a. Public opinion polling. Research in this area has progressed markedly. Since 1940 two important non-profit organizations have been formed. The National Opinion Research Center, conducting surveys from Denver, furnishes facts of interest to the press and to schools, and issues reports on special topics. The Office of Public Opinion Research at Princeton collects and organizes data from other polling organizations, and conducts basic research on polling problems. Foreign democracies have followed the lead of the United States in establishing polling agencies, several of them having affiliation with the American Institute of Public Opinion (109, 249).

Much research has concerned itself with the form that questions should take (31, 32, 241, 172, 208, 209, 210, 266). Not only does the wording of questions have a decisive influence upon the results obtained (especially if public opinion is not clearly formed and

fixed regarding an issue), but the position of the question in a series is known to affect the results. There seems to be a tendency, for example, for the respondent to select the last, most easily remembered alternative when the question is complicated (241); likewise for him to choose the middle ground between the two extremes of opinion. If, therefore, the moderate opinion is placed in the final ordinal position, we may expect a specially large distortion in the results (209). The presence or absence of alternatives in a question makes a great deal of difference. In one *NORC* study, asked whether the United States should plan for peace now or wait until after the war is won, only 37 per cent of the respondents favored the first alternative; whereas, asked simply whether we should plan for peace now (yes or no), 80 per cent gave an affirmative answer (210).

The dyadic relation that exists between the interviewer and the respondent is beginning to receive intensive study. Katz reports that middle-class interviewers find more conservative opinions among lower-class respondents than do lower-class interviewers. Further, lower-class interviewers find more radical views among lower-class respondents on labor questions, especially when union members are interviewed. On the other hand, there are certain types of questions where an interviewer of high social position seems to carry a certain prestige, and actually to secure more accurate returns (136). Whenever questions strike directly at the respondent's sense of social status he tends to protect himself by giving conventional answers. This point has been established by comparing the results of equivalent groups, one of which was interviewed by the ordinary methods, the other given the opportunity to cast their votes into a padlocked ballot box. The difference is enough to warrant secret balloting on questions that threaten the respondent's sense of status (59).

One of the most important findings in this area is the adequacy of a small sample for rapid "spot surveys." The accuracy of a small sample, if carefully chosen, has made it feasible to obtain reports within a few hours on the state of public sentiment concerning pressing social issues. The value of this method to public officials, especially in times of crisis, is evident. How extensive is the government's reli-

ance on this source of information will not be known until after the war.

b. Open-ended interviews. A variant upon the polling technique is preferred by those who wish to obtain a fuller account of the respondent's views. The Division of Program Surveys of the Department of Agriculture has relied extensively on this method. The respondent is asked, for instance, *"How do you think this war is going?"* or *"Do you think the United States should police the world to keep peace?"* Simple yes or no answers are not wanted. Interviewers are instructed to probe and determine the "whys and wherefores" of the opinion.

c. Panels. Lazarsfeld has described the merits of a lasting sample that can be employed for repeated interviews (158, 159). By using such a panel, change in opinion can be more accurately measured than with a shifting population of respondents. In some cases panels of experts are particularly useful. For example, certain well informed refugees have been polled at intervals to determine their estimate of the condition of morale among the German people.

d. Trends. For the historian or for the political scientist, as well as for the makers of public policy, the direction of change of opinion is of special significance. A study of trends in the immediate prewar period (1939-1941) is presented by Cantril (57, 58, 60) who offers the following generalizations: (*a*) By and large public opinion does not anticipate emergencies, but only reacts to them; (*b*) it reacts with marked sensitivity to important external events; (*c*) it does not remain aroused for a long period of time, unless the people feel acutely involved; (*d*) at critical times, people are willing to assign more rather than less responsibility to their acknowledged leaders; (*e*) during critical times the government seems more remote and less personal to the people; (*f*) public opinion is colored by desire; (*g*) many of the apparent inconsistencies of public opinion can be accounted for when the basic frame of reference from which specific opinions are derived, is discovered.

Remmers (236) measured the attitudes of similar samples of college students toward Germans, Japanese, Jews, and Nazis, in 1935 and again in 1942. He found that no substantial change in attitudes towards Germans and Jews occurred in the seven-year period, although the variability of these attitudes was increased. Attitudes

toward the Nazis and Japanese changed sharply toward the negative end of the scale at the same time that these attitudes changed toward greater homogeneity. The influence of (artifically created) news was investigated by Newcomb (216). Two similar groups of students were told, one of a German victory, the other of a German defeat. Both announcements resulted in a shift of attitude toward greater aid to Britain, although Freshmen and upperclassmen differed in the amount of shift. This is interpreted as a function of the difference in information, understanding, and concern in the two classes.

Strang (270), investigating change in attitude as a result of one of Churchill's speeches, found widely varying initial attitudes toward England, none of which was changed by the speech. However, the method was defective in that both the initial and terminal attitudes were collected after the speech.

e. Combined methods. Polling, it is commonly believed, is useful but superficial. If this is true combined methods ought to yield a truer picture of public opinion. We have mentioned some such studies in a previous section (122e, 181, 182, 80). Crespi at Princeton also reports in progress a three-cornered study of opinion combining balloting, case-studies, and attitude scales. He and his associates are ascertaining (*a*) public opinion toward conscientious objectors, (*b*) psychological correlates of attitudes toward conscientious objectors, and (*c*) attitudes of conscientious objectors in the context of the war.

f. The crisis in questionnaires. The desire of the government to operate in close connection with the needs and opinions of the public precipitated the late plague of questionnaires—which in turn precipitated a revolt against "bureaucracy." This situation led to centralized supervision of questionnaires. Sells reports how the Statistical Standards Office of the *OPA* now evaluates every proposed public reporting form (questionnaire) in terms of the burden it places upon the respondent, its simplicity and intelligibility (255). Many of the procedures of psychometrics and market research have been adopted in order to improve the quality of the forms authorized for use.

The professionalization of civilian intelligence work is further illustrated by the creation of new civil service positions, e.g., *public*

opinion analyst. Likewise, the presence of so many social psychologists today in the intelligence branches of the *OWI, FCC, OSS,* shows that the process of informing the government of the national state of mind is, in large part, a psychologist's specialty.

g. Work of the Field Coöperation Subcommittee.[2] Four requests sufficiently definite to require specific action have been received from officials of government agencies. We are able to respond to three of the four:

1. A list was furnished of psychologists to be invited to serve on a "Correspondence Panel."

2. High-school and college students furnished a report of the five word-of-mouth communications touching the war which most impressed them—such as anecdotes, jingles, jokes, wisecracks, striking statements, etc. Special attention was given to obtaining a large number of responses from Negroes as an index to the state of mind of selected Negro groups. Certain marked contrasts between Negro and white word-of-mouth communications were found.

3. Following Mandel Sherman's investigation in Chicago (257) we were asked to obtain and to analyze a large number of essays written by high-school pupils on "What this War Means to Me." As compared with asking set questions, such a relatively unstructured assignment has obvious advantages for untrained persons. But it is clear that we must have a carefully drawn set of analytical categories.

Our experience reveals some of the difficulties of analyzing such essays: From the government agency came a list of "areas" which eventually yielded 35 "objects" of attitude: the 18-year old draft, the "glories" of war service, regulation of workers, reduced standards of living, domestic unity, etc. Preliminary analysis showed that there were 17 qualitatively different attitudes which might be displayed toward some or all of these objects. We thus come to a two-way table of nearly 600 cells, and one such table needed for each essay if the individual's pattern of attitude responses is to be preserved.

There is no need to point out that such a tabulation worksheet would be impracticable. After much trial-and-error we evolved a

[2]Reported by H. B. English, Chairman, of the Subcommittee on Field Coöperation.

much simpler set of worksheets whereon the analyzer can show for each essay separately the attitude displayed toward each "problem area" or "object." Various combinations from these worksheets can then be made in a central office. Actual use has revealed ambiguities in the schedules, but it is believed that we have a formal plan which may be of considerable utility in the attitude analyses of written compositions. (Copies of the worksheets and directions may be obtained from the Chairman.)

About 30 psychologists collaborated in gathering the essays from several thousand pupils, and in having them analyzed, generally by their advanced students. As of Armistice Week, 1942, some rather disconcerting though not surprising attitudes on the part of our young people were revealed.

3. *Minorities*

How a nation so heterogeneous in composition and so polyglot can at the same time be both powerful and unified is cause enough for astonishment. Yet the conditions of our strength and the amalgam of the American tradition have not been studied by social psychologists. It is rather the causes of friction, and the dangers of disruption from within, that have drawn attention.

Needless to say, social psychologists are only a small group among those interested in minority problems. Effective collaboration with government offices and with other disciplines is urgently needed.

a. National minorities. The magnitude of the problems concerning minorities in time of war is illustrated by the research memorandum prepared by Wirth for the Social Science Research Council (298). He had previously defined the term minority as applying to those who because of physical or social or cultural differences occupy a differential position, receive differential treatment, and regard themselves as a people apart (299). Reserving the Negro problem for another memorandum by Johnson (133), Wirth (298) lists 10 areas of research. Among the problems of special interest to psychologists are (*a*) the participation of minorities in the war; (*b*) the effect of the war upon the assimilation of minority groups; (*c*) the effect of the war upon the attitudes and political behavior of American minorities; (*d*) propaganda and counter-propaganda affecting American minorities. Specific problems are outlined in each area and bibliographies are given.

Psychologists have almost exclusively confined their researches to the propaganda problem. Bruner, Sayer (54), and Smith (261) report on the radio listening habits of the Italian community in Boston. The first study concerned itself with short-wave listening habits and found that about one-fourth of this selected population did listen (shortly before the outbreak of the war) to short-wave newsbroadcasts emanating from Italy. Although some of these listeners were "militant Italians," dissatisfied with their lot in the United States and feeling that "Italy can do no wrong," most were simply radio fans or desirous of obtaining prestige among their neighbors by quoting to them radio reports from Rome. Smith's report, based on the previous finding that Italian domestic programs are listened to almost as much as the programs in English, concluded that because Italians in Boston have not adjusted and assimilated to the the wider community, broadcasters of Italian programs should adopt a more constructive attitude (261).

In an informal way many psychologists have concerned themselves with the use of the foreign-language press and radio to promote morale among national minorities. Typical is Roucek's unpublished memorandum urging that the information provided for German-Americans be based on four fundamental principles: (*a*) considering individual German-Americans as an inseparable part of the United States' history and development; (*b*) contrasting the American way of life with that of Nazi Germany; (*c*) participation of the American-Germans in the struggle against Nazism; (*d*) stating plans of world reorganization after this war as related to Germany's future. In regard to Czech- and Slovak-American newspapers and radio programs, two essential goals should underlie our efforts: (*a*) unification of various Czech and Slovak factions in this country, (*b*) the harnessing of both Czech and Slovak energies to the American cause.

b. The Negro minority. Public opinion polls and morale studies invariably have shown the Negro to have lower morale. Clark says: "The basic factor of Negro morale . . . is frustration, complicated by deepseated bitterness and resentment at the mockery of democracy of which so much of their lives is a constant reminder" (66). All writers on the subject agree with these premises.

To improve matters at least three avenues must be followed:

(*a*) the basic social reforms which are obviously needed; (*b*) a campaign to inform white people wherein they frequently and unintentionally injure the feelings of Negroes (9); (*c*) the utilization of Negro schools and colleges in such a manner as to prepare Negro youth to cope with racial barriers, to be aware of their special problems, to see the relation of their problems to those of the weak and oppressed everywhere (107). Another Negro educator pointed out in March, 1942, that, on the whole, Negro leaders do not identify their interests with the Victory program of the nation (296). However, he feels that if the federal government provides them with an opportunity to coöperate with dignity, the great network of Negro schools and colleges could then be utilized to educate the whole Negro population to the effect that this war is their own fight for freedom.

c. Attitudes toward minorities. The morale of minorities depends in part upon the attitude of the majority toward those minority groups. The causes and dangers of race prejudice and of scapegoating, "the full-fledged persecution of those against whom we are prejudiced and against whom we discriminate" are described in an unpublished study (122a). The motives for scapegoating are considered to be: thwarting and deprivation, guilt, fear, self-enhancement, conformity, and "tabloid thinking." Methods for combatting scapegoating are listed under the headings of "education for insight," "education for understanding," and "changing external conditions that lead to scapegoating." The order is a big one. A case study of scapegoating not involving racial groups can be found in an analysis of the Boston public's reaction to the Cocoanut Grove fire (287). Many popular presentations of the dangers of scapegoating are available. Two particularly good ones have been published by the *OFF* (218) and the *YMCA* (109).

Several studies are under way studying attitudes toward minorities. Fearing, at the University of California at Los Angeles, reports that a series of True-False items and two social-distance scales, one with respect to the Japanese and one with respect to the Mexicans, are being circulated in educational institutions in the South, the Atlantic Coast, the Middle West, and the Pacific Coast. A primary purpose of the research is to discover what regional differences may exist regarding attitudes toward the minority groups in

question. Smith, at the University of Hawaii, reports on "A comparison of judgments of prejudice toward certain racio-national groups before and since the entry of the United States in World War II" (263). Onishi, at the same University, has studied attitudes towards the Japanese language schools in 1937 (222) and since our entry in the war.

Lanier reports the results of a social-distance scale administered to high-school seniors and adults from several geographic regions. Although the ranking of nationality groups differs considerably from that found in prewar nationality studies, it is interesting to note that it does not necessarily correspond to the political alignment of the United Nations. For instance Chinese, Communists, and Negroes are still more unpopular than Germans. It was also found that high-school seniors are more prejudiced than adults, and that for both groups prejudice seems highly generalized (154). Gundlach, at California, reports an unpublished study to the effect that college students tended to rate our allies favorably, our enemies unfavorably, and our own nationality minority groups intermediate. No very significant differences were found between students on the East Coast, in the Central area, or on the Pacific Coast, nor were there consistent differences between men and women.

d. Anti-Semitism. A very special "internal" problem in the United States is the attitudes toward the Jews. Klineberg believes that attitude studies do not show a trend toward an increase in anti-Semitism (142). This author reports that although since 1939 many anti-Semitic organizations have sprung up, they have been counteracted by organizations devoted to the fight of anti-Semitism. He also quotes the results of a Gallup poll taken in October, 1941, which showed that only one person in 16 thought that the Jews were trying to get us into the war.

Yet, national surveys of opinion show that still a great number of people, over 50 per cent, believe that the Jews have too much influence in this country (211). An analysis of rumors current throughout the United States in September, 1942, lists anti-Semitic rumors third in order of frequency, or 9.3 per cent of the total. The larger pecentage of these rumors are found in New England and along the Atlantic seaboard (143). Further data on anti-Semitism obtained by the polling method have been assembled by the National

Opinion Research Center, Denver, and the Office of Public Opinion Research, Princeton. These are available to qualified investigators.

The general literature on anti-Jewish prejudice is too large to cite here. Psychologists will find helpful the recent volume by Graebner and Britt in which 16 Jewish and non-Jewish collaborators argue for a solution to the Jewish question, the writers, in general, favoring complete assimilation (110). A critique of this point of view, and of the book, is presented by Roback (238).

4. *Rumor*

Rumor in wartime is important for two reasons. (*a*) It is one of the destructive weapons in the arsenal of psychological warfare, and (*b*) since it reflects the anxieties, desires, and hostilities of the public, it is an indicator of morale. Thus far in the war, the popularization of the problem of rumor has outstripped its scientific analysis. Those who have worked in the field know that newspaper and magazine columns are always open for a discussion of the problem and for warnings to the public. Indeed, it may be said that social psychologists have had so much popularizing to do that they have not yet had time to formulate fully the basic psychology of rumor.

Following the initial establishment of a "Rumor Clinic" in the Boston region, described in *The Reader's Digest* (186), 150 requests were received for advice regarding the establishment of similar operations in all parts of the United States and Canada. The number of such "clinics" operating in newspapers today is not known, but it is probably in excess of 40. Standards for the operation of such agencies, based on Boston's experience, are available in mimeographed form (178), and other advisory literature may be obtained from E. L. Horowitz, *OWI,* Washington.

There are various ways of classifying rumors. One study in 1942 listed them by frequency as follows: wedge-driving, 65.9 per cent; fear, 25.4 per cent; pipedream, 2.0 per cent; miscellaneous, 6.7 per cent (143).

There is as yet very little at hand on the psychology of rumor. Lowe (175) in a short note lists the mechanisms of rumor as suggestion, eye-witness fallibility, perversion of testimony, and ambiguity. A more complete account is available in the *A B C's of Wartime Rumor* (122b) which discusses the following points: rumor as

an index of morale; its circulation as a result of ambiguity in the news; the motives in rumor transmission; factors determining belief in rumors; factors determining the content of rumors; i.e., perceptual, cultural, and motivational factors; conditions under which a rumor will be transmitted and widely disseminated; how rumor may be employed as propaganda; and how rumor may be controlled. A more definitive paper on rumor is planned by Knapp (144).

Besides rumor clinics, other methods of combatting rumors are pamphlets (43), leaflets, and posters put out by public and private organizations.

Little experimental research, besides the collecting of rumors, has been accomplished. An investigation under the direction of F. H. Allport is in progress at Syracuse. By a questionnaire it is attempting to get at the motives for believing rumors; it is also projected to investigate the effect of rumor clinics on rumor belief and disbelief. Fearing, at the University of California, is conducting a study of rumor in relation to morale and public opinion. This includes returns on (*a*) a rumor questionnaire which contained questions referring to actually observed acts of aggression between Caucasians and Japanese, and rumors of such aggressions; (*b*) returns on a rumor questionnaire circulated the day following the so-called Los Angeles "bombing;" the questionnaire covered what respondents had actually seen or heard during this event and rumors concerning it; (*c*) a similar questionnaire circulated a year later, covering what was remembered and still believed regarding the so-called "bombing."

Allied to the study of rumor, are studies of superstition. Emme (89) reports on the origin and modification of superstitious beliefs in college students, showing that specific instruction on superstitions decreased the number of superstitions believed in. Schuler (251), points out that in wartime credulity of stories of the supernatural increases, because our belief in rationality is easily broken down in times of stress, and because wartime conditions make for heightened suggestibility. This fact is borne out by the increase of interest in psychical research in wartime (88) and the increase of interest in astrologers as reported in England (181). Most stories of supernatural reported in wartime are wish-fulfilling, and although this may be a harmless practice in peacetime, Schuler points out how it can, and has, been used by the Nazis to undermine morale.

5. *Morale-Building*

a. Nature of democratic morale. Morale-building is commonly viewed by psychologists as a long-term activity, concerned with fundamental objectives and ideals. Thus Murphy advocates that morale-building should be based on plans and hopes for a better world after the war: people must believe that their sacrifices of economic advantages and civil liberties are not in vain, and that they are preparing a better environment for their children (204). G. W. Allport has listed 11 psycho-ethical principles expressing the means by which morale may be stimulated and maintained in a democracy (6). Although some of these principles may be violated in wartime, this author believes that on the whole our morale-building agencies have adhered to these democratic standards. Historical evidence shows that even if we momentarily under pressure of necessity abandon certain of these standards, there is little danger of lasting consequences, for in the past, after every war, recovery to democracy has always been made. G. Watson has found these 11 psycho-ethical principles characteristic of the procedures employed in normal trade-union activities (293). French, discussing the motives that make for a successful democracy, shows how rebellion against tyranny must be coupled with gradual learning of self-government. Individuals in renouncing the selfish security of childhood must substitute the satisfaction of mutual support of each other (97).

b. American morale. Certain authors have devoted themselves to an analysis of the American tradition and national character with a view to showing the specific implications for the building of American morale. Murphy asserts that to be successful a morale program must be based on something most Americans believe in, an idea to be selected from the Jeffersonian tradition (204). Mead (188, 189) sees hope in the American traditions of idealism, invention, and reformism. Because Americans in childhood are not accustomed to dictation from the father but are trained to compete with equals and to participate as members of relatively small groups, defense activities should be substituted for natural rivalries in small groups, using natural rather than appointed leaders. Bateson (23) and Bateson and Mead (24) claim that because of our peculiar patterns of interpersonal and intergroup relationships we have to (*a*) treat our enemies as a single hostile entity; (*b*) avoid soft-pedal-

ling of the disasters of war; (*c*) be reassured regarding our successes. Sargent points out three features of current American attitudes which must be taken into account in morale-building: (*a*) suspicion of purely emotional appeals; (*b*) demand for factual evidence; and (*c*) desire for realizable goals (247).

c. General considerations. McCord discusses morale-building for the total personality (185). The Id must be satisfied by removal of threats to food, comfort, and pleasure; the Ego must be reassured in its demands for knowledge; the Super-Ego must be relieved of anxiety rising out of participation in the war. Lindeman states that the sources of morale are a confident attitude toward the future, the capacity to behave efficiently under pressure, and a variety of perspectives (171). Morale thus defined can be generated through recreation and sport activities.

Participation is essential for a healthy morale. Landis sees the *OCD* of which he is director, as the ideal outlet for participant behavior (153). Pamphlets entitled *"What can I do?"* (278) and *"Civilian Morale-Building Techniques"* (122f) list various spheres of participation. But at various times public opinion polls have shown that poor people receive fewer invitations and opportunities to participate in volunteer war activities than do the well-to-do classes.

d. Mental fitness. Selling gives 10 suggestions on how best to make a mental adjustment under war conditions (253). These may be taken as typical of many similar lists issued by governmental and private agencies: (*a*) do not talk too much; (*b*) do not listen to gossip; (*c*) do not allow your emotions to be swayed by single episodes; (*d*) have faith in your experts; (*e*) economize; (*f*) stay at home; (*g*) watch your health; (*h*) recreation is necessary; (*i*) do not "let George do it"; (*j*) be alert. Suggestions such as these, as well as the extensive services of clinics and social service agencies, are instances of applied social psychology in wartime, but the work of consulting psychologists and mental hygienists is so broad that it must wait for some separate survey and evaluation.

e. Mind-wardens. Various plans for the establishment of a civilian service of "morale-wardens," "mind-raid wardens," "neighborhood consultants" have received considerable discussion. The training of individuals to be high-morale "carriers" is described in one report which states the functions of these morale-wardens to be

(*a*) to provide information to the community; (*b*) to initiate neighborhood meetings and discussions dealing with various aspects of the war; (*c*) to serve as friendly counsellor and adviser to people in the neighborhood; (*d*) to assist civilian defense personnel (122j). A few localities seem to have tried experiments in this direction, but the practice is apparently not widespread, probably because formalization of neighborhood activities in this way does not come easily to American communities, and there is also a note of patronage involved in the whole conception. The "block-wardens" which the *OCD* is now trying to institute will fulfill functions similar to those listed above, but their main purpose is to stimulate civilian defense activities among the members of their "block."

f. Educators and morale. In many quarters the preparation of teachers and schools for morale work has received particular attention. The U. S. Department of Education, which has had a morale-building program since before Pearl Harbor, distributes pamphlets on how to read the news (85), on guidance problems in wartime (84), on the use of forums and discussions in the schools and in the community (279, 280). The Division of Educational Services of the *OWI* provides discussion pamphlets and guides for use in public discussion.

g. Leadership. The connection between leadership and group morale is obvious. Bavelas distinguishes between authoritarian and democratic leaders, and reports the effect of training in democratic leadership on the morale of the retrained leaders and on the groups which they led (25, 27). After three weeks of training the frequency with which retrained leaders used authoritarian direct control methods of dealing with the children dropped from 77 per cent to as low as 4 per cent. No change occurred during this period in the behavior of non-trained leaders. In that time the morale of the leaders being trained changed from a definitely low morale to a definitely high morale; similarly the morale of the children led by democratically trained leaders increased, as evidenced by increase and greater constancy of membership and the showing of greater initiative.

Lippitt and Zander describe the methods used in a current project of scoutmaster training (173). This project attempts to evaluate the effectiveness of different types of leadership training of volunteer men leading youth groups. Results will soon be available for re-

port. Another related study concerned itself with an analysis of the leadership and group dynamics of a number of Scout groups of "high morale" and of "low morale."

It is perhaps noteworthy that the armed forces stress both the "selection" and the "training" of leaders. Up to now psychologists with their testing devices have contributed more to selection than to training. The latter field is only now being entered.

The urgency of the problem of leadership is evident. Recently the Emergency Committee in Psychology of the National Research Council established a subcommittee on the subject with H. E. Garrett as Chairman.

h. Testing the results of morale-building efforts. Social psychologists are able in many instances to test the effectiveness of morale-building activities. Public opinion polls are helpful in this connection. Commenting on the work of the *OWI,* Bruner points out that for all the effort spent on educating the public, approximately one-third of the population feels that they have no clear idea of what we are fighting for. That this is not due only to confused war aims is shown by the fact that less than one-tenth of the population can name the four freedoms. A conspicuous measure of the failure of propaganda on the home front is the fact that two weeks after the unconditional surrender conference (Casablanca), 28 per cent of the people were still willing to talk over peace terms with the German army (62).

The successes of government campaigns in England have been studied by Mass-Observation (180). Taking some typical instances, Mass-Observation found that on the whole they were unsuccessful. The campaign to educate the public on what to do about poison gas was at first unsuccessful because of bad distribution of the leaflets. However, in July of 1941, three months after the initial distribution, and after the same instructions had been plugged in a poster campaign, there was actually a deterioration of knowledge. In answer to the question what to do when splashed with liquid gas, 42 per cent gave the correct answer in April and only 23 per cent in July. During that same time gasmask carrying dropped from 20 per cent to 10 per cent. Other campaigns were similarly unsuccessful. Summarizing their experience, Mass-Observation points out that the British government has been guilty of too many indiscriminate and

unco-ordinated campaigns. The many appeals of the government appear, to the citizen, to have equal weight, and he does not know which to follow. Further, the government's emphasis on danger and pleas for action do not impress the citizen: he feels that if there really was danger the government should and would *order,* not merely plead!

There is a lesson to be learned from the fact that interest in morale declined in the period between midsummer of 1940 and the spring of 1942. These dates mark roughly the interval during which there was concern for the nation's safety. As soon as the United Nations took the offensive rôle and mobilized their resources, that is to say, as soon as most people had found a place in the war effort and felt that progress was assured, there was a distinct falling off in discussions of morale and morale-building. Attention turned to specific issues geared to the machinery of war—to rationing, production, taxes, casualty lists, Guadalcanal, Tunisia. In short, morale—the organization of individual attitudes for a common endeavor—is a matter of concern when this organization is not assured, and when the capacity of the nation for such an organization is problematical. Morale, like sanity or health, is taken for granted. Only when it is threatened do we grow concerned.

6. *Media of Communication*

a. The press. F. H. Allport and his Syracuse associates have studied the effect of war news headlines on the reader (3). They find that headlines relevant to combat are more morale-raising than those having no bearing on combat, that headlines referring to the enemy are more effective than those referring to the allies, that those arousing anger are more effective than those arousing fear, that those showing us on the defensive are better than those portraying our forces as victorious. The experimental method employed in the study is described in detail in a current number of *The Public Opinion Quarterly.*

Winship and G. W. Allport, analyzing over 3000 newspaper headlines over a three-month period, find that they fail to meet the standards for morale-building headlines established in the Syracuse study. Headline-writers, by playing up victories and playing down defeats, engender complacency. The same authors find that while

most editors *think* that they sell more papers when headlines are optimistic, in fact they do not do so. The sales of the *Chicago Tribune* are three per cent above normal when headlines are optimistic, but the sales of the *Chicago Sun* are three per cent above normal when the headlines are pessimistic. Five other representative newspapers show no appreciable change in sales as a consequence of the coloring of the day's news.

Editorials, columns, and letters-to-the-editor have been studied to see whether they raise or lower morale (122i). Several judges, following standards agreed upon, made the ratings. Comparing eight New England newspapers with the *New York Times* it was found that the latter had a much greater morale-raising effect, and that six of the New England papers, in effect, criticized the Administration more severely than the Axis. The chief weakness of the New England papers was the vagueness and indecisiveness of their editorials and their relatively large number of disaffected columnists.

A set of rules based on this work was prepared under the title of "A Suggested Code for Critics" (122p); this document has been reprinted in the *Congressional Record.*

An interesting symposium on "The press and the contemporary scene" can be found in the *Annals* (18).

b. Symbolic control. Bellak lists and evaluates some current slogans. Their power is explained by reference to the hypotheses of various psychological schools. Among the factors influencing their effectiveness are the prestige of the originator, changes in public sentiment, and the satiation effect which seems greater for some slogans than for others (28).

Schuler has made a special study of *V for victory* as a form of symbolic social control. He points out that such simple symbolism may become a "verbal realism" and play an important part in morale, or because of its flexibility it may become a frivolous or degenerate symbol exploited by advertisers and pranksters (250). George claims that propaganda depends on the use of nouns which personify ideals and to less extent on a few simple verbs used in the imperative or indicative. Language teachers should point out that propaganda may be detected by the fact that it is "not based on good grammar" (103).

c. Radio. The advantages of radio as a morale-builder have

been discussed by Angell. As compared to the press, radio disseminates news more quickly and to a greater audience, requires less effort than reading (impossible for some), and has the psychological advantage of the living voice (13). Lazarsfeld has edited a series of studies in radio research. Several of these studies are of interest to psychologists, especially one concerned with radio and press prefence among young people, which found that the radio, although considered the better source of news among high-school juniors and seniors, is not used so exclusively (160). Childs reports on the shortwave listening habits in the United States and finds that no more than one per cent of the population tune in the shortwave band. The majority of these listeners are men who are radio-fans (64). Siepmann summarizes conveniently the peculiar rôle of radio in wartime, placing more stress than does Childs upon the influence of shortwave listening at home and abroad (257).

d. Movies. The movies as morale-builders have been discussed by Wagner who insists that to be effective movies cannot separate propaganda from entertainment (286, 287). The incomparable value of the film in fashioning attitudes in wartime seems to be beyond the realms of dispute, though few psychological studies have been made. One isolated research on the propaganda effect of a movie is reported by Bruner and Fowler who by means of a questionnaire determined audience responses to the Nazi film *Blitzkreig im Westen* in May, 1941. They found that in spite of an extremely homogeneous audience, mostly male students between the ages of 19 and 22, four different classes of reactions could be observed: belligerent, defeatist, alarmist, and indifferent. The majority of the students reacted against the appeal of the film, thougn a third felt either during or after the showing that resistance to the Nazi war machine would probably be futile (53).

An interesting symposium on the problems of mass-communication in a democracy has been edited by Waples. The effects of the press, radio, and film on public opinion are discussed, as well as mass-communication in democratic and totalitarian governments (288). The Nazi newsreel and its propagandistic tricks are treated by Kracauer in one of the confidential memoranda prepared by the Experimental Division for the Study of Wartime Communications, under the direction of H. D. Lasswell (147).

e. Pictorial material. The use of pictorial material, especially comic strips, as morale-builders is discussed by Meier who rates well-known strips, cartoonists' techniques, posters, etc., according to their morale value (191). Wyatt analyzes the devices used by political cartoons, the effects of cartoons on the reader, and the psychological processes involved in bringing about these effects. He shows the remarkable way in which an event, idea, or whole complex theme can be arrayed in a comparatively small space. Not only the rational content of any topic, but the feelings and emotions originally connected with it, are conveyed by the cartoon (303). Lively has listed the propaganda techniques of cartoonists during the Civil War (174).

f. Music. The use of music during the Civil War is examined by Stone who discovered that successful tunes were usually ballads or religious music popular in previous years. Then, as now, synthetic attempts to secure successful music through prize competitions failed (269).

The Nazis' use of songs for morale purposes is appraised by Warren who finds that in our culture Christian hymns are the nearest counterpart of the German *Parteilieder* (290).

7. *Propaganda*

What social psychologists are now contributing to the battle of propaganda will not be known until after the war. When the story is told there will be achievements of marked ingenuity to record. Challenged by the Axis example, our own organizations for psychological warfare are determined not to be outdone in the gentle art of the "morale offensive."

Gone are the subtle distinctions established during the 20's and 30's to mark off propaganda from education. Wartime brooks no such distinction, and indeed, earlier distinctions seem untenable in retrospect. Accurate education may on occasion have the greatest possible propaganda effect. A soldier impressed by the documentary film *A Prelude to War,* sponsored by the U. S. Army, remarked *"It's all propaganda, but I guess it's true."* And so it is.

a. What is propaganda? Creel, head of the Committee of Public Information in the last war, states that democratic propaganda can have no other basis than "honesty and candor." He

defines propaganda as the fight for the promotion and maintenance of morale (72). Some investigators argue for a broad definition of propaganda in terms of influencing people's thoughts, sentiments, and emotions in order to affect their relation to some portion of human society in which the propagandist is interested (122c). Bartlett distinguishes between democratic and totalitarian propaganda. The former aims to remedy the handicaps of ignorance and illiteracy, whereas totalitarians intend to continue these handicaps indefinitely through the control and suppression of the normal channels of public opinion (20). One way of doing this is stated by Kris who shows how German leaders propagandize at mass-meetings while the British leaders talk as individuals to individuals (148).

The literature up to 1940 has been previously reviewed by Smith (260), and a more comprehensive bibliography has been compiled by Lasswell, Casey, and Smith (156) and continued by Smith (259) in each issue of *The Public Opinion Quarterly,* since 1937. A selected bibliography is also available in mimeographed form (122m).

b. Propaganda campaigns. A few papers have attempted to lay down general rules of propaganda warfare. "The analysis and execution of propaganda campaigns," (122c) lists six phases to be studied: (*a*) Policy, the broad aims of propaganda; (*b*) Organization, who puts the propaganda forth; (*c*) Conditions, to whom and where the propaganda is directed; (*d*) Strategy, what the propagandist seeks to do in order to attain the aims of his policy in the light of conditions; (*e*) Themes, the content of propaganda; (*f*) Tactics, the specific means of the propagandist.

Most other general works confine themselves to discussions of tactics. Watkins suggests that we carry on offensive psychological warfare by creating disturbances in the economy and normal living habits of the Germans (291). Bondy urges the use of food as a propaganda weapon, but points out it can only be effective if it is part of a systematic reconstruction plan (36). Peatman advocates the use of American popular music on shortwave broadcasts (223).

Studies have been made of the methods employed by the Germans in the psychological warfare. Farago discusses the strategy and tactics of German psychological warfare, its cultural background and the weapons it uses (94). He also states the principles on which the morale offensive against the United States is based, such as the

need for a fluid and flexible policy, the detection and exploitation of existing issues rather than the creating of new ones, the necessity for having agents in the United States both as "trouble-seekers" and "trouble-makers" (93).

c. Propaganda analysis. Bruner has set forth the purposes of propaganda analysis to be (*a*) correlation of changes in propaganda with changes in public opinion; (*b*) correlation of changes in propaganda with political trends; (*c*) comparing propaganda methods with each other; and (*d*) studying trends in propaganda. For this purpose he devised nine dimensions of analysis, such as "dissolving-unifying," "stratified-homogeneous," etc., and applied this scheme to German shortwave propaganda to the United States in 1940 (51).

d. Content-analysis. Another method of analysis has been presented by Lasswell and his coworkers in a series of memoranda (102, 128, 129, 135, 155, 161, 162, 163). Content-analysis does not concern itself with the "intentions" or the "effects" of propaganda, but purely with its "characteristics." Categories of classification are defined according to the type of material being analyzed, and the analyzers note the frequency of occurrence and ratios of frequency of these categories. Reliability studies show that there is marked agreement between analysts, the more so as the categories are made more rigid.

e. Other methods. F. H. Allport analyzes the "theses" of Axis broadcasts. The frequency of such theses as Defeatism, Derogation, etc., is correlated with the degree of acceptance of the listeners. The method is described in detail in an unpublished memorandum (2). It was established that single ideas may be accepted, while the message as a whole may be rejected; also that at one period of time the Axis broadcasts was pressing the very point home which Americans were most prepared to accept, namely, the possibility of defeat.

From November, 1939, to June, 1941, the Princeton Listening Center was engaged in systematic monitoring and analysis of shortwave broadcasts (65). Similar work is now carried on by the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service of the *FCC*.

The Research Project on Totalitarian Communication devotes itself exclusively to the study of German radio propaganda. In a series of memoranda available for limited circulation, Kris and his co-workers have analyzed German radio news bulletins (149a), German War

communiqués (149b), and the broadcasts to England of the so-called German Freedom Station (149c). German propaganda during a period of defeat, the winter campaign of 1941-42 is examined as it appears in both home-front propaganda and the war communiqués and news bulletins issued for domestic and foreign consumption (149d). A typological analysis of stereotypes used in German news broadcasts is also available (149e). This list does not exhaust the varied publications of the Research Project on Totalitarian Communications. Further information can be obtained from its central office, 21 West 12th Street, New York, New York.

8. *Comparative National Psychology*

"The ultimate success of psychological campaigns depends on a thorough knowledge of the country against which the campaign is to be directed and a basic analysis of its inhabitants' national character and temperament!" This is the view of the Nazis as reported by Farago (94). By now the democracies have also realized the importance of comparative national psychology to both war and peace. Witness the numerous governmental agencies in the United States concerned with the problem. Witness too, Ambassador Grew's statement that only a "goodly knowledge of the psychology of foreign countries" will offer insurance against future wars.

a. National character. Bateson makes a case for "national character," arguing that "some degree of uniformity of character structure occurs among the individuals who participate in any given set of cultural behaviors. . . ." Such national character can be described by studying the contexts in which social learning takes place, thus arriving at the *Weltanschauung* of the majority of individuals in the group (22).

b. Ideologies. Just beginning is the psychological study of ideologies, which Ekstein describes as "a mixture of scientific and everyday statements, of philosophical generalizations, principles, orders, expressions of decisions, and faith." Only part of an ideology can be refuted, the inner part or "dogma" is akin to religious faith and cannot be refuted (86). Psychologists, to be sure, are following rather than leading the ideological procession. Their studies are only partial as compared with those of historians, philosophers, and literary writers. Yet, the ingredients of ideology are the attitudes of

individuals, and until the account of their genesis and structure is further advanced, no superorganic exposition of the subject will be adequate for the use of educators, propagandists, statesmen, or administrators.

c. Germany. Hitler's appearance and personal manner, his attitude towards religion, power, the Jews, race, sex, and art are described by Vernon (285). A possible explanation for the paranoid character of his attitudes is given in terms of a sado-masochistic split in his personality, which in turn might be explained by his dual identification with a mother he loved and a father he hated and feared. Erikson proposes by an analysis of Hitler's speech imagery to get at the common symbols that make the "Germans one people and one danger" (92). The important thing, Erikson maintains, is not to study the dynamics of his psychopathic personality but to realize that:

> Hitler senses to what extent it is safe and expedient to let his own personality represent with hysterical abandon what lives in every German listener and reader. Thus the rôle he chooses reveals as much about his audience as about himself. An analysis of Hitler's imagery discloses that it is essentially adolescent. The influence of this imagery is most dangerous to children, for whom Hitler has replaced the complicated conflicts of adolescence by a single motto: *Youth shapes its own destiny.*

Yet Hitler, the emancipator of adolescents, at the same time decrees that "the family is to be made the nucleus of the new state." This contradiction between goals and ideals may ultimately bring about the fall of the Nazi ideology. In fact, in Hitler's speech of September 30, 1942, Erikson sees the magic spell of Hitler's imagery being broken (91). The author predicts that "sooner or later the youthful elements in all countries will strive to replace the commercialized imagery of dominance and submission with that of fraternal leadership, of realistic brotherhood."

The dogmas of Nazi ideology are listed by Ekstein as: (*a*) the leader principle, (*b*) alien forces persecute and suppress innocent Nazi-Germany, (*c*) Germany is superior, (*d*) war is a blessing, necessary for a strong and great nation, (*e*) the individual is unimportant, (*f*) anti-Semitism (185). These dogmas, says the author, are regressive and as such contrast with the democratic ideology

which represents ego-strength. This author adds that we should avoid the common contention that "the Nazi ideology is a symptom of the German character which repeated throughout history the same mental pattern." It is possible to arouse similar latent infantile feelings in all of us, though it may be easier, for historical reasons, to do so in Germany. Whether the Nazi ideology is or is not a logical continuation of past decades of German thought, and therefore lockstitched into the fabric of German character, is a question vigorously disputed by contemporary writers. Concerning it, psychologists are for the most part prudently silent.

Other typical comments on the German character come from Brickner (41) and Moellenhoff (199). The former concludes, as do many writers, that Germany is a "paranoid nation." The latter shows the similarity between the Nazi accusations against the Jews and the Nazis' own mentality and action. The Nazis thus project their guilt upon a scapegoat who, by sharing the guilt, makes it bearable.

d. Propaganda to Germany. All writers seem agreed that propaganda to Germany, today, can help to break German morale. Suggestions to this end are based not only on general information of the kind described above, but also on the analysis of the class or group structure in Germany and the possibilities of differential appeal. For the most part work on this subject is confidential. Some suggestions can be found in unpublished memoranda (122e, 122k, 122n). Propaganda should appeal to positive values, i.e., give security and emphasize good points of German tradition. At the same time the propaganda should be militant by emphasizing Germany's danger, increasing feelings of guilt, etc. One report emphasizes the similarities and differences between the predicaments of the Germans in 1918 and today and shows how these can be taken advantage of in propaganda (122k). Another, after analyzing the state of opinion in Germany (Summer, 1942), proceeds to list various themes to be stressed in propaganda, and concludes with samples of leaflets (122l).

It is obvious that psychologists not connected with the Government can do nothing but pass along such suggestions as these to their colleagues in *OWI* and *OSS*. The relationship has been cordial and active. How helpful it has been will not be known until a record

can be written of the actual strategies employed in our morale offensive against enemy nations. It seems safe to predict that the techniques of psychological warfare have made greater strides than we now know, but, at the same time, smaller strides than some people imagine. We may call attention to one limiting condition that concerns broadcasting, not ordinarily appreciated by non-government psychologists. Germans are hungry for news; they listen at great peril to our broadcasts and their receiving sets are inferior and constantly deteriorating. For these reasons the elaborate and subtle radio scripts submitted to official agencies by both amateur and professional psychologists simply cannot be used, however excellent they may be in principle.

e. Japan. Little has been written about the psychology of Japan and even less published, though no doubt the Government agencies concerned have important information at their disposal.

Gorer presents an analysis of Japanese character structure, and makes suggestions for propaganda (108). He uses psychoanalytic concepts exclusively although he recognizes that economic and social factors must also be taken into account. One of the basic traits of Japanese character is their neatness and fastidiousness at home, contrasted with their savagery and violence when face-to-face with the enemy. This trait, Gorer explains by reference to the rigid and early toilet-training of the Japanese infant. Another important trait relates to the great disdain with which the Japanese treat their mothers and wives, as contrasted to the fearful and rigid respect they have for the father and for the Emperor.

Another approach based more on political considerations is presented by Menefee (192). Today (January, 1943), he says, our propaganda to Japan stresses the fundamental antagonism between Germany and Japan, stresses American power, and attempts to instill doubts concerning Japanese news reports while arousing confidence in ours. But, says Menefee, we do not directly combat Tokio's propaganda, especially in the countries she occupies. Tokio emphasizes race, citing examples of racial discrimination in this country, of mistreatment of the Japanese internees, and of "white imperialism." At the same time, Tokio like ourselves emphasizes our strength and hence makes this war seem a life or death struggle to the Japanese. To be effective our counter-propaganda must start with our

improved treatment of the Nisei in this country and with publicizing this fact. Menefee also maintains that we should not use pro-democratic appeals for these have no meaning, nor should we scare the Japanese by the prospects of great hardships to come, for threats are a challenge to them. On the other hand, we should make use of the Japanese fear of ridicule and superstitious nature, and we should combat the "win or die" idea by showing that defeat does not mean destruction for the nation; we must present clear-cut and honest postwar plans.

Japan's political propaganda in Southeast Asia is analyzed by the same author (193). The main lines of such propaganda are: (*a*) the fomenting of hatred against whites, Anglo-Americans, imperialism; (*b*) appeals to nationalism; (*c*) religious appeal; (*d*) the teaching of Japanese language and culture. To combat these we must: (*a*) reach the people effectively; (*b*) tell them of the United Nations' successes; (*c*) expose Japanese intentions to exploitation; (*d*) give instructions in sabotage; (*e*) most important: present a good postwar program.

Angyal studies the new cultural movement in Japan, by analyzing the Japanese periodical *Cultural Nippon,* a journal designed for foreign consumption (15). The magazine follows the usual methods of propaganda: endless repetition of a few themes and the use of dogmatic statements instead of appeals to reason. The themes may be summarized as follows: (*a*) unlike any other state, Japan is governed by an emperor who is a direct descendant of God; (*b*) the Emperor loves his people who are his children and his people are bound to the Emperor by unlimited loyalty and feeling of veneration; (*c*) Japanese culture is superior to all other cultures for it has absorbed the best from many sources; further Japan is the real center of Western, Hindu, and Chinese culture; (*d*) Japanese religion is superior because it is in perfect harmony with Japan's national policy. Because of this superiority of Japanese culture the world family should be ruled by the divine Emperor of Japan. Japan has only brotherly love towards China, deploring the fact that China is fighting her one and only friend who is trying to save her from disorganization and collapse.

f. Other Countries. Morale in Italy (76) and in France (70) has been described with special reference to disruptive forces. One

group of psychologists has attempted the study of the central values of French society to which propaganda may be geared (122g).

But as we survey available materials in this general area we come to realize that comparative national psychology is still an infant discipline. Promising for future development is the work of the Council on Intercultural Relations whose aims as described by Bateson include the marshalling of whatever facts concerning national differences may aid in hastening victory and in laying the foundations for a sound peace (22).

g. Attitudes toward enemies and allies. A trend study of attitudes toward foreign countries is reported by Kuhlen. Opinions about 40 foreign countries were ascertained five times between December, 1939, and November, 1940, the ratings being taken each time after some major development in the war. As expected, external events did induce changes in attitude. During that period dislike for Italy increased markedly, dislike for Japan increased somewhat, dislike for Germany decreased slightly, dislike for Spain remained slight, dislike for Russia decreased after the termination of the Russo-Finnish war, though Russia still remained unpopular. The popularity of Great Britain declined steadily during the year, but increased again in November, persumably because of her renewed activity in the prosecution of the war after the fall of France. Liking for China increased slowly but steadily (150).

A second study by Kuhlen reports the attitudes of comparable groups of college students five months after the U. S. entry into the war, in April, 1942, and a week later in May, 1942. The second group was tested again in December, 1942 (151). Findings showed that our enemies, Italy, Germany, and Japan, were about as heartily disliked a year before we got into the war as five months after our entrance. Attitudes toward our allies improved, however, although Great Britain was still surpassed by seven other countries, and Russia was only moderately approved. Approval of China increased markedly. Qualitative data reveal that Japan is the most thoroughly hated of our enemies, that Italy is scorned and thought contemptible, that in the case of Germany a clear distinction was made between the government and the people. Conflict and uncertainty of attitude toward Russia were evident, and there was considerable evidence of mistrust and questioning of Great Britain's motives along

with great admiration and liking for her. Students in the East seemed to dislike our enemies more than Midwestern students. The studies of Lanier (154) and Remmers (236), discussed elsewhere in this paper, are also relevant.

9. *Industrial Morale*

Maximum production is as important for modern warfare as an efficient and well-run military machine. Although industrial psychologists have long concerned themselves with time and motion studies, and problems of lighting and rest periods, it is only recently that they have studied problems of industrial morale, of the relationships between workers, of the worker's personal life.

Hull and Kolstad, reporting on a questionnaire to measure industrial morale, find that it is not determined simply by pay, hours, and working conditions, but that equally important are the satisfactions that come with recognition of and respect for the worker's own personality (125). More concerned with personal factors is Watson's study of morale during unemployment which by case studies and counsellor's ratings shows that low occupational morale is associated with bad personal adjustment while good morale is associated with early emotional security, past successes, marriage and family life, education, interesting and useful work, realistic aspirations, social participation, and religion (294).

a. Leadership. Bergen, reporting on a test to determine employees' grievances, finds that good leadership and efficient management increase morale more than do wage increases (30). The problems of industrial leadership have been further investigated by Bavelas (26). In one preliminary study the manager, the personnel director, the shop superintendent, and the foremen of a small Midwestern factory were questioned on their conception of the foremen's task. The manager felt that foremen should be more aggressive, the personnel director thought they should use a more reasoned approach, the shop superintendent claimed that the effectiveness of the foremen depended on support from the management. All three assigned great weight to the union's influence which they said was "bad." The foremen, however, attributed most of their difficulties to their own feelings of personal insecurity and to the "chronic gripers" among the workers. In the same paper, Bavelas reports on

the result of the training of trainers of industrial apprentices. Even with only eight hours of training in simple democratic approaches to learners, the foremen charged with this training were able to increase greatly the efficiency and output of the learners.

b. Unions. Watson studied the morale of labor unions and concluded that besides the extension of democracy and the purging of racketeers within the union, the reforms which would have the most effect in raising union morale would have to come from outside the union: (*a*) fair treatment of labor in the press, radio, and movies; (*b*) equitable control of profits; (*c*) cessation of anti-labor agitation (293). Talbert has popularized the findings of psychologists on morale in an article on *"Morale in Unions"* written for the *Railway Clerk,* a union publication (272). Knickerbocker and McGregor have made a study of the reasons for success and failure of union-management committees (145).

c. Wartime industrial morale. In Great Britain, Mass-Observation studied the relationship of the psychological basis of labor difficulties to civilian morale. Some of the sources of difficulties are: (*a*) decrease in the profit incentive because of high taxation and (*b*) decrease in the wage incentive because of the limited possibilities for spending. Remaining incentives are the employees' feelings of insecurity for the future, and the employers' desire for the release of restrictions. These motivations clash and do not make for efficient production (179).

The attitudes of war workers towards wartime labor problems have been appraised by the polling method. The Office of Public Opinion Research reports that (*a*) workers are about equally divided as to whether their plants were being run efficiently or had room for improvement; (*b*) as many as 57 per cent felt that they were not kept fully occupied at their jobs; (*c*) most workers felt that there was neither a shortage nor a superabundance of labor (220).

d. Absenteeism. Psychologists are just beginning to investigate the psychological causes of absence from work. Deutsch considers absenteeism as evidence of emotional conflict and lists the character types commonly found involved: the "run-away" type, the "nobody" type, the "grandeur," "exhaustion," "sensitive," and "moody" types. The difficulties of wartime living increase these

mental instabilities and the shortage of man-power makes absenteeism an ever-recurring problem since those discharged from one plant get rehired by another (78).

An interesting attempt to combat absenteeism is the Morale Building and Absentee Reduction Service of the Parent's Institute. The stories of "Absentee Al" and "Careless Charlie" are presented by brightly colored comic strips (200, 201).

e. Women in industry. The difficulties of getting women to work in warplants in a small Connecticut town have been investigated by Crane who reports that women are willing to do dirty work if the hours are convenient, the pay sufficient, and if their men will let them. The War Service Committee of the New York Women's City Club has made a survey of non-professional women in volunteer war service work, and the American Association of University Women is launching a campaign to enlist college women in the war factories.

The problems arising from the employment of women in industry are stated by the National Foreman's Institute, which also lists the types of jobs for which women can be trained (19). Laird and Laird compare men and women workers in respect to strength, muscular control, emotionality, and mental ability (152). In Great Britain, Blood, Harwood, and Vernon report that women present more psychological problems than do men in war industries (33).

f. Music in industry. Kerr reports several studies in this field. In the first, trainees in a defense school were asked to rate their confidence in certain psychological powers of music (139). An overwhelming majority believes it helps them when they are tired, helps them forget their worries, helps them in performing wearisome tasks, improves their feelings toward their associates. Similar results are reported in a study of industrial workers who had been accustomed to hearing music while they worked (140). This second study indicates that there are two factors in the influence of music: a psychological effect and a factor of social efficiency. A third study asked job applicants to indicate their preference for work in one of the following: (*a*) floor with music, (*b*) either floor, (*c*) floor without music (141). The questionnaire also asked the reasons for the answer and how often the respondent would like to hear music while working in an industrial plant. Over half of the job applicants

interviewed stated that they wanted to work on a floor with music, only 18 per cent want to work on floor without music. Further unpublished studies on the subject are reported by Kerr and his collaborators at De Pauw (96, 138, 194).

10. *Essentials for Normal Living*

a. Food habits. The Committee on Food Habits of the National Research Council illustrates the interdisciplinary coöperation as well as the practical slanting in research so characteristic of wartime social science. The committee states as its function the formulation of recommendations to the Director of Nutrition upon problems relating to food habits, and the conduct of studies and investigations (190). Elsewhere it is stated that the committee intends to mobilize "anthropological and psychological insights as they bear upon the whole problem of changing food habits in order to raise the nutritional status of the people of the United States. . . ." (68). Among the problems to be considered are: the determination of food habits that are rooted in the national culture of the people, the psychological use of food as reward and punishment, the importance of meals in cementing family ties.

Illustrative of the memoranda on the distinctive food patterns of different sub-cultural groups in the United States is one by Joffe and Nizzardini on Italian Food Habits. This report not only tells of food preferences and diet but also analyzes the social structure of the group, and possible media and techniques for spreading food information (132).

Lewin, for the committee, has devised a method for the study of attitudes towards food and sources of food ideology (167). He feels that one of the best approaches is the study of the food habits of children, because children—those under 18 comprise more than 35 per cent of the population—influence the buying habits of the mother. Further, children more readily reveal the facts which we wish to know. The inquiry ascertains (*a*) what foods the child usually eats, (*b*) what foods he likes and dislikes, (*c*) what food he would be praised for eating, why and by whom, (*d*) what food he would be scolded for eating. Illustrative results are given for schoolchildren from a middle-sized Iowa city. Another study by Lewin investigates the relative effectiveness of lectures and a method of group

decision in changing food habits (168). The passive lecture method has almost no effect in inducing various groups of women to start serving glandular meats. Group decision (democratic voting), on the other hand, results in a high percentage of change.

Still later work studies the relative value of group decision, lectures, and *requests*. Requests have some value as incentive to change, but much less than the group decisions. There seems to be one condition, however, in which the democratic method of group voting fails: this occurs when the vote is close and the decision extreme. This latter finding indicates a potential social law of considerable importance. One is reminded of the failure of prohibition legislation when a large minority rendered the enforcement of an extreme decision impossible. One thinks ahead also to the situation that will prevail if drastic steps for the peace are taken in defiance of some large minority view.

The work of the Committee on Food Habits is further described by Mead (190), and a symposium on the problems of nutrition in wartime is available in *The Annals* (16). One factor contributing to changing food habits in wartime America is the rationing of food stuffs. Government agencies have investigated the "morale effect" of rationing, but none of these studies is at present available.

b. Housing. Another practical area that is commencing to engage the efforts of social psychologists is that of housing, not only for defense workers, but for the postwar population as well (215). Important in this area is the new tendency to regard housing not merely as a problem in economics and architecture but as a problem of an intimate psychological order. Take the concept of "adequate space." Such adequacy cannot be judged only in terms of floor area or cubic content of rooms but must consider whether in each case the planning and organization of space will serve the functions of family life and the needs of each individual within the dwelling. Provision must be made for the leisure activities of adults and children, such as homework, play, hobbies, entertainment of friends, privacy. Suggestions are given for the organization of space in the dwelling as a whole and in individual rooms (12).

Psychological considerations loom large in the planning of cities of the postwar world. A report of the National Resources Planning Board urges the rebuilding of cities "not by the square block but

by the square mile" (214). The concept of "neighborhood" should be the guiding one, a neighborhood being an area

> ". . . supplied with its own play spaces, schools, health center, places of assemblage for worship and civic discussion, its own retail shops. . . . The neighborhood is urged as the natural unit for the child and the older person as well as for those in the prime of life. The neighborhood-in-the-city must be of a size and character that will not dwarf its inhabitants into anonymity, but will provide a stage of sufficiently intimate scale so that the citizen can master it and play his rôle with satisfaction."

Further neighborhoods and large housing projects should not be confined to any one national, occupational, or income group, but should provide for "the free mingling of all groups in a democratic society."

These broad statements of policy, we may safely predict, are a prelude to more active coöperation between housing authorities and social psychologists.

c. Economic habits. War brings about catastrophic dislocation of our economic habits. Srole appraises this dislocation in his study of the economic impact of the war on a small town, *"Ameriton."* After listing the actual economic changes in Ameriton in terms of shortages, curtailment of materials, plant conversion, Srole investigated the attitudes of small business men toward these changes. He found that a majority of his informants felt that the shortages of merchandise were necessary in order to win the war; and that the price ceilings were necessary, fair and workable; however, about 50 per cent felt that *OPA*'s explanations were not as clear as they could be. Other results were: 47 per cent approved the 40-hour week; 62 per cent approved, with qualifications, of labor unions; 66 per cent disapproved of the sales tax. The study further derives and applies a measure of "economic morale." Contrary to expectations, businesses expecting to be closed by the war, such as hardware and automobiles, gave their owners less anxiety than those whose prospects were not so hopeless. Anxiety was greater, for example, among dealers in food and clothing than among filling station proprietors who were "on their way out."

Another psychological approach to economics is Katona's study of inflation. Inflationary price increases, he holds, are not automatic

consequences of economic factors. On the contrary, whether a rise in price of a commodity will be followed by an increase or a decrease in demand depends on what the consumer expects of subsequent developments. Thus the psychology of inflation concerns itself with the source and strength of expectations. Laboratory experiments have shown that reiterations of statistical data and categorical pronouncements create weak expectations which can easily be dispelled, whereas presentation of data in such a way that the subject can understand why prices advance or remain stable influences attitudes to a much greater extent. The author also treats the psychological problems raised by the government's price fixing, taxation, and savings program (135a).

11. *Demoralization and Its Control*[3]

Demoralization, according to Sullivan, takes many forms, ranging from temporary discouragement to chronic despair (271). It includes momentary states of panic, desire to escape, and permanent psychoneurotic disablements. By studying the mechanisms of demoralization among our own people we learn techniques of morale offensive to be used against the enemy.

a. Mental disease. Considerable interest is shown in the trends of mental disease during wartime. Dunham suggests that the mental disease rate is slightly higher in coastal states than in the more secure Middle West (82). Various writers maintain that the anticipation of bombings may have a more harmful effect than actual bombings: in Bristol, for example, after heavy air attacks a group of 800 children was studied and of these only four per cent showed signs of severe strain (230). It may be that actual bombings fulfill two of the principal conditions for strong personality integration: they intensify the individual's loyalty to his country, and they help to externalize his aggression (268). A good bombing, it seems, makes the average person less self-centered, and therefore less likely to be demoralized through conflict. Gillespie confirms these hypotheses with numerous examples and also describes a variety of psychological reactions to bombings, such as acute panic, passive reaction, or direct bodily manifestations of fear. Although those who are predisposed, along with those repeatedly exposed to frightening situations and

[3]Prepared with the assistance of B. Dowling.

those who have undergone unusually terrifying experiences, may develop lasting psychoneurotic symptoms, much more surprising is the symptomatic recovery of some individuals with chronic psychoneurotic conditions (104).

Rozenzweig and the staff of Worcester State Hospital are studying causes of mental breakdowns in the Army, especially schizophrenics, since these are the most numerous cases. Effort is made to trace the effects of the more or less uniform stress situation created by military induction in the precipitation of the illness.

b. Air-raid protection. The problem of security against panic has concerned British psychologists. Thouless reports that common shelters are better than individual shelters, because of the presence of officials and fellow-sufferers (273). There is evidence, however, that the upper economic and educational classes prefer to remain in small family groups during air-raids, whereas the lower economic and educational levels, by and large, prefer the large communal shelters (283). Most important of all, it appears that air-raid wardens, or those who have definite prescribed duties, suffer less from fear and demoralization than do people who have nothing to do except wait in idleness (119). A series of papers on shelter and evacuation problems reported at a meeting of the British Psychological Society in July, 1941, takes up similar questions (42).

The place of psychiatric social workers in air-raid shelters has been discussed by Scoville, who reports that the number working in shelters and in evacuation centers in Britain has been greatly increased (252). One of the tasks of these workers is to find routine activities for people to engage in in order to prevent panic.

c. Demoralization of rejected draftees. Depressions, drinking sprees, family frictions, hypochondrias result from draft rejections, and create a serious problem in lowering the morale of potentially useful men (254). Examining physicians are so pressed with work that they do not always guard against arousing anxiety and feelings of inadequacy in the men whom they reject. In certain localities, vocational placement agencies or the Red Cross have endeavored to prevent demoralization among the rejectees, but by and large the problem remains unsolved.

d. Crime rate. As in previous wars it seems again to be true that adult delinquency decreases while juvenile delinquency rises.

Statistics in this area are not uniform and writers do not agree on details (232, 82). There seems, however, to be no doubt that prostitution creates most of the increased delinquency problems. At the same time added trouble to schools, police, and their families, is caused by unruly boys who have not yet reached military age. Burgess discusses the incidence of increased marriage, and birth rates, and the effects of the withdrawal of men from the family and of women's entrance into industrial life (56). To offset the demoralizing trends within family life, Gardner prescribes three necessary conditions for strong family development: emotional and economic security, participation of all family members in common activities, strong parental leadership (101).

e. Humor. The value of humor as an offset to demoralization has not received the study it deserves. Obrdlick calls the type of wit that flourishes in a precarious or dangerous situation "gallows humor" (217). He reports its currency in Czechoslovakia during the days of invasion. By directing ridicule against the oppressors, the sufferers bolster their own courage. Similarly the Norwegians, in collecting and publishing some of their own jibes at the Nazis, have invented an aphorism that has psychological pungency—*"He who laughs—lasts"* (221).

f. Homesickness is a wartime problem of first magnitude, one that is difficult to meet with understanding. McCann's review of the literature on this subject covers symptoms, susceptibility, precipitating conditions, theories as to its nature, and methods of prevention and treatment (184). Excessive attachment to one's mother is found to be associated with severe neurotic forms of nostalgia (242). Wittson, Harris, and Hunt describe "cryptic nostalgia," a disturbance which they have observed in the Navy (300). It differs from ordinary nostalgia in that there is no depression, no overt symptoms of emotion, no insight. It can best be described as "home fixation" rather than "home sickness"; the recruit is unable to get his mind off home and he continues to live in the old environment rather than actively merging himself with the new one. Layman, reporting maladjustment cases in the Army, finds that marked emotional dependence on the mother is a distinct factor in some breakdowns (157).

Farago reports that the Germans have given the problem much

attention (94). Homesickness can be alleviated temporarily through frequent furloughs, but a more permanent solution rests in the thorough habituation of conscripts to the military life since it is found that professional soldiers suffer no homesickness.

g. The experience of Germany. Demoralization as a result of Nazi persecution has been reported by refugees, laymen, and psychologists. Allport, Bruner, and Jandorf, analyzing 90 life histories on the subject "My life in Germany before and after January 30, 1933," find: (*a*) inability of the individual to realize the imminence of catastrophic change, coupled with mechanisms of self-protection against full realization of danger; (*b*) catastrophic social change does not ordinarily succeed in effecting radical transformations in personality; (*c*) the persecuted minority is forced to a position of extreme opposition where, at the same time that it indulges in unrealistic escape-activity, it also sharpens its planning powers and inventive efforts; (*d*) the responses to frustration include besides aggression and its substitute activities such reactions as resignation, regression, conformity, changes in standards of evaluation, heightened in-group feelings, increased fantasy and insulation, and above all, increased planning and problem-solving (8).

The effects of life in concentration camps have been described by Bondy (35) and by Bruno Bettelheim (6033 Dorchester Avenue, Chicago, Illinois). The latter, in an unpublished paper entitled *"Individual and Mass Behavior in Extreme Situations,"* describes the initial shock of finding oneself imprisoned, the differences in the psychological reaction to extreme experiences, and the prisoners' relation to the Gestapo.

h. Postwar demoralization. Pratt fears that 10 years of dependency fostered by the depression, followed by the war years which constitute a holiday from adult moral responsibility, will create the gravest sort of issues for the period of demobilization (227). What the problems here will be no one can fully predict. The process of rehabilitation is, however, the topic of interest among many planning committees inside and outside of the government. H. E. Burtt of Ohio State University is Chairman of a subcommittee of the *NRC* Emergency Committee in Psychology assigned to this problem.

12. *Children in Wartime*[4]

This committee began work in the fall of 1942. At first three tasks were undertaken: (*a*) Current bibliographies, available to anyone who wished this service; (*b*) The collection of information regarding local needs of children in different areas, and the activities of colleges, social agencies, schools and other groups trying to meet these needs; (*c*) The formulation of research suggestions of two types: suggestions for research in local areas, to be planned and supervised by investigators in those areas; plans for collaborative research in local areas, which would follow plans outlined by the committee, in order to provide comparable data from different subcultures in the United States.

The bibliographies were prepared and are available from the committee; these cover the material up to January, 1943. At this point the preparation of bibliographies was considered unnecessary in the future, since both the *Child Development Abstracts* and the *Psychological Abstracts* were increasingly adequate for this purpose. The collection of information regarding local needs and activities also appeared subsequently to be unnecessary, since the Children's Bureau and offices of civilian defense were carrying on this work. The third task received the chief attention of the committee and will be discussed in a separate issue of the *Bulletin*. The present report is concerned chiefly with the main observations and insights appearing in the literature on children in wartime up to April 1, 1943, with leads to some of the chief sources of information.

a. Bibliographies. Despert's study, *Children's Reactions to the War* (77), includes a critical discussion of other studies and a bibliography of titles; a list by Jersild (130) will appear shortly in the *Psychological Bulletin,* in addition to an earlier short list published in the *Teachers' College Record* (131). Shirley, at Wellesley College, has an unpublished bibliography on children in wartime. A selected list of reference by Conover is available from the Library of Congress (69). Our own bibliographies include a unit on Professional Literature on Children in Wartime, and another on Popular Literature on Children in Wartime, with a third on British and Canadian Publications on Children in Wartime. Although few ref-

[4]By Eugene Lerner and Lois B. Murphy for the Subcommittee on Children in Wartime.

erences appeared in the earlier issues, the *Psychological Abstracts* has had more frequent listings since November, 1942, and *Child Development Abstracts* began a special War section with the January, 1943, issue. Readers who wish to keep up with the material should watch both of these abstracts, and also keep alert for articles in the *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry,* the *Survey, Progressive Education, Childhood Education,* publications from the Children's Bureau, the U. S. Department of Education, the National Child Labor Committee, *Probation,* and other journals concerned with the welfare of children.

b. Surveys of needs of children. Zimand's report, *Child Manpower*—1943 (305), suggests that probably half a million children under 16 years are working full or part time, often at serious cost both to health and to education. There are many reports of increases in delinquency, estimates varying from 10 to 60 per cent in different sections. An overall picture of what is happening to children in the United States under wartime conditions is contained in a Children's Bureau report in March, 1942 (277), from which we quote the following summary:

> (1) Police department records in some cities for which information is available show an increase in the number of arrests of girls, of a younger age group and for more serious behavior than those formerly arrested; in the number of requests to investigate complaints of neglect of small children; in the number of complaints of illegal employment of boys.
>
> (2) School authorities, attendance and work-permit offices report: large numbers of children leaving school for employment; a tremendous amount of shifting from one job to another; school children working long hours on full or part time jobs; and an increase in the volume of truancy.
>
> (3) Some child-welfare agencies are receiving an increasing number of requests for foster-home placement of young children.
>
> (4) Social casework agencies that accept cases of young persons with behavior problems testify to a shift to a younger age group of girls, with more serious problems than those the agencies were previously called upon to serve. Those agencies that offer immediate, temporary care report an increase in the number of run-away boys and girls and in girls coming to cities to seek employment.
>
> (5) Youth-serving and recreation agencies report a great turnover in personnel of the groups participating in their pro-

grams and a tendency toward a shortened span of interest on the part of the group members.

(6) Juvenile court records indicate a considerable increase in the number of cases of girls and a trend toward a younger age-group for both boys and girls.

(7) Several State training schools reported more younger children committed in 1942 than in 1941. The middle teen-age group was reported as the largest of the age groups under care.

Two factors run through all agency reports. They are shortage of personnel and shortage of community facilities with which to meet these problems so rapidly accentuated by wartime influences.

This statement of conditions applying to school-age children and adolescents needs to be supplemented by a report of the needs of children under six whose mothers have gone into war industry. For instance, in the January, 1943, *Survey,* mention is made of a study of 5,000 St. Louis families in which the mothers were employed in the summer of 1942. Only one-tenth of one per cent of the young children were in day nurseries or nursery schools, and two-thirds of the children were being cared for under doubtful or unsatisfactory arrangements.

c. Children's reactions to wartime conditions. As in other sections of this review, a complete bibliography is neither feasible because of space limitations, nor necessary because of easily accessible bibliographies already mentioned. We shall mention a few major reports. Among the British studies, the Cambridge Evacuation Survey (127) has been widely quoted. Of over 3,000 children evacuated to Cambridge in September, 1939, somewhat more than 1,000 remained in July, 1940. The study was based on questionnaires answered by the billeting officers and essays written by the children. According to the former, less than 10 per cent of the children were definitely unhappy, more adolescents than younger children. Contacts with the family through visits from parents, or presence of siblings in the same billet, made for happiness. Suggestions on how to avoid misfits in billeting are given. Chief reasons for return were anxiety of parents or children; parents' dissatisfaction with the foster home; financial difficulties in paying for the boarding service, the trips, etc. Elliott's survey (87) of the British experience summarizes observations up to the time of her visit in the winter of 1941-42.

Reports by Anna Freud and Dorothy Burlingham for the Foster Parents' Plan for War Children include brief case reports on neurotic behavior of children separated from their mothers; Anna Freud's position that separation from the mother produces worse shock than does bombing is now well known (98).

Children in Wartime, edited by de la Warr (289), contains a number of brief sections by psychiatrists, analysts, and other workers with children, on such topics as the uprooted child, the deprived mother, teachers' problems, homes for difficult children, arising from the British situation. This is useful especially for teachers of child psychology who are working with undergraduate students, because of its compact and readable summaries of children's feelings and needs. Graduate students and teachers will prefer to cull the *British Medical Journal, Lancet,* and the *British Journal of Educational Psychology,* for more thorough discussions. Everyone who uses these British reports should remember how different are the types of family dislocation here where no evacuation has occurred except for Pacific Coast Japanese. Psychologists on the coast areas where evacuation plans are being considered will do well to acquaint themselves with the British literature.

Growing Up in a World at War, from the Institute for Psychoanalysis in Chicago (126), is available in pamphlet form for students, parents, and teachers. This, as well as the books for parents by Baruch (21) and others, are concerned largely with the understanding of, and ways of dealing with, the anxieties and aggressive feelings and behavior which are accentuated by the war situation.

A small group of studies is concerned with the ideology and attitudes of children in wartime. Preston's study of children's reactions to a contemporary war situation (229) was based on a comprehensive information test and test of partisanship and attitudes given to almost 600 children between 8 and 15 years; at that time (1940) a large proportion of children under 18 years appeared to "lack a spontaneous attraction toward preoccupation with, and capacity for mastering the intricacies involved in a war situation." To our knowledge, this type of study has not been repeated with any group since Pearl Harbor. Cronbach's study (73), based on high-school students' answers to the question, *"If the United States enters the war, how will your life be affected, both during the war and per-*

manently?" showed that the majority had no clear idea of the probable effects of the war, or the possibility of overcoming or adjusting to its difficulties. A study of Boy Scouts (40), against the background of the vagueness of children's ideas and attitudes illustrated by the first two studies, suggests how quickly the child's intellectual orientation toward the war can become stereotyped around such concepts as liberty, democracy, or Germany-is-fighting-to-conquer-the-world, the-United-States-wants-the-four-freedoms. No studies are known to us which attempt to relate the emotional adjustment of the child and cognitive aspects of his reactions to the war, with the exception of Chess's little study reported to the February meeting of the American Association for Orthopsychiatry. Stimulated by Bender and Frosch's contention (29) that the war was a medium for the expression of conflict rather than a cause of conflict, Chess undertook to study children's expressions of aggression and hostility, or passivity and docility. He solicited "victory slogans" from children with the help of the *All American Comic Book,* the Pleasantville Cottage School, and the Colored Orphan Asylum at Riverdale, New York. Analysis of about one thousand slogans received indicated that aggression was in the background, and that precise active tasks rather than general principles were the chief interest of the children. This study, however, was made before many casualties from actual combat had an opportunity to stir strong personal emotions, and at a time when emphasis on scrap-collecting and other concrete tasks was strong. Retests of the studies by Preston, Hendry, and Chess would probably reveal interesting shifts due to changing war conditions. Aside from the sociological data on increases in delinquency, there is little known about the effects of war on aggressive behavior, attitudes, or needs; Coghill (67) suggests that the possibility of brutalization of children through the increase in acceptance of aggression, is more serious than the danger that children will be shocked into illness. In the New York area, some nursery school teachers report a dramatic increase in the intensity and duration of aggressive play, while others observe no such change in the children, according to data reported by Murphy at the February meeting of the American Association for Orthopsychiatry.

d. Research activities of the Subcommittee. In the face of the fact that most of the material published in the first year of the war

is of necessity based on partial and limited data, the Subcommittee has undertaken to outline possibilities for research. Many psychologists working with children were circularized to find out who would be interested in a collaborative investigation. Outlines were prepared and sent to those who wished them. A number of teachers assigned this project to students interested in the effects of the war on children. Clinicians are collaborating by reporting material from their clinical groups. Because of war demands, withdrawals from departments, etc., it is uncertain how many of these studies can be carried through. The work will be most effective if men and women psychologists not likely to be called into service, both those in active professional work and those with children of their own, would undertake such studies in their own localities. The Committee will be happy to send further information on the plan to those who request it.

13. *Planning for the Postwar Period*[5]

By way of a broad generalization we may say that from the fall of 1940 to the spring of 1942, social psychologists were pre-occupied with problems of civilian morale. After that time, an increased feeling of national security encouraged them to turn their attention to the problems of peace. The crest of this new interest has not yet been reached, and in the current output of studies we find a curious mixture of war plans and peace plans. One gains the impression, however, that, given the opportunity to do so, psychologists much prefer to plan for peace than to wage war.

Before the spring of 1942 there was scarcely an instance of psychological literature dealing with postwar problems. Soon, however, the tide began to roll in. A forerunner was Murphy's presidential address to the Eastern Psychological Association, distinguished for its emphasis upon the inter-disciplinary character of the problem, and for its plea that psychology revise its own scale of values so as to confer status and approval upon those who explore new paths in the study of man's social relations (206). Equally insistent upon the need for psychologists to coöperate with other social scientists and with politically strategic groups are Gundlach (113) and Lewin (166).

[5]Prepared with the coöperation of G. Murphy and G. R. Schmeidler.

Probably the first psychologist's book to express an interest in the postwar period was Tolman *Drives Toward War,* which after tracing the causes of war to the frustration of biological needs and to the failure of social techniques for satisfaction of those needs, proceeds to suggest methods for widening man's sphere of identification (with a world state) so that his aggressive impulses may be allayed or at least turned away from nationalistic warfare (274, 275). One other book recently published is by May (183). In prospect is a volume by Stagner, as well as a possible Yearbook of the *SPSSI* edited by Murphy, the Chairman of its Peace-planning Committee. How many other psychologists are incubating books on the same subject we cannot say. At least three have announced their intentions, though they prefer for the time being to remain nameless.

Besides these general treatises we find a large number of special studies, devoted to some of the detailed problems that will arise in the postwar period.

a. Re-education at home. No psychologist who discusses current American attitudes in relation to world affairs is complacent about the situation that prevails. Attitudinal trends are noted, and remedies for attitudes inconsistent with a sound peace are proposed by J. S. Bruner, who recommends that postwar planning take the offensive, appeal to self-interest, and make postwar issues political issues (unpublished study). Seward, in a program of research for the National Council of Women psychologists, is planning an extensive study of sex rôles in postwar society (256), and invites collaboration.

b. Re-education abroad. The problem of democratic re-education of the Axis countries baffles everyone. Opinions are sharply divided among educators and publicists: some maintain that there are enough sane and, at heart, democratic Germans, to handle the problem themselves; others insist that outside forces must dictate the educational policies of the defeated Axis. C. Bühler considers the German national character to be dangerous to the rest of the world (55), while Bode sees hope in the five million workers who sympathized with Socialist ideas and did not subscribe to nationalistic aspirations (34). Schreier recommends preparatory investigation of re-educational methods through interviews with prisoners of war, interned alien citizens, and Nazis of American citizenship. The same

author thinks it necessary to "type" German aggressiveness, since each form demands differential treatment (248).

The problem reaches beyond any solution that might be suggested by psychologists, complicated as it is by the desire for revenge which is undoubtedly growing among the peoples of the occupied countries. Most psychological writers, however, seem to agree on two points: that the Axis nations should be afforded some legitimate way of regaining their self-respect and feeling of importance, in order for them to work toward a constructive and stable peace (cf. 165); and that the engaging of the population, young and old, in reconstruction projects conducted under conditions of self-regulation and self-government as far as possible, might well be the healthiest preliminary training in democracy.

Mowrer proposes an international commission on education to be established by the United Nations; and he cites 20 pressing problems, basic to the task of re-education (202). Applying to the situation certain widely accepted principles of learning, Stagner (267) and Lerner (164) show their consequences for administrative policy in occupied countries. Hartmann points out vividly the opposition between impulses for revenge and a constructive peace program (210, 121). Other psychologists, agreeing with Hartmann that revenge should be avoided, cite the argument that the punishment of war criminals will almost surely make them national martyrs (203), or that punishment is never a wise preliminary to reform (90). On the other hand, Sanford argues that guilt is a state of mind that craves expiation and punishment, and should not be forgotten in planning our treatment of Axis populations (245).

Maier contrasts the rôle of frustration and of positive motivation (goal-seeking) in the formation of attitudes (177, 176). Desirable re-education can be secured only through the appeal to goal-seeking motives and not through the employment of frustration. There is an apparent contradiction between Maier's argument and the position of Alexander (1), Bostock (39), May (183), and English (90) who maintain that a world state may safely be established before there is a popular willingness to cede loyalty to it. The reasoning of these authors is based upon the adaptability of the individual to new institutional forms, and to his tendency to grow more and more partial to an institution to which he is accustomed.

c. The period following the armistice. Domestically the time of demobilization will create grave problems. Most of these are related to the central issue of re-employment (227, 228, 235, 264). If these problems are serious for America they are perhaps doubly serious for enemy and occupied countries. How they are to be met is the subject of several thoughtful articles. For example, the centering of our policies for overseas administration in the process of feeding the populations has been proposed (166). The control of media of communication in order to interpret the sufferings of the past, and to direct the hope for a democratic future is held necessary (14, 267).

A general proposal that secures widespread endorsement is that the transition period following the war be set off sharply from the ensuing period in which a permanent peace and world government may be attempted. Popular writers have referred to this proposal as calling for a "cooling off period." The argument in its favor rests upon the contention that the inevitable frustration and disappointments of the immediate postwar period should not be associated in people's minds with the eventual peace whose shaping will take time and preparation. It has often been pointed out that the error of Versailles was to associate its humiliation of the German people in their own minds with the democratic leaders under the Weimar Republic, rather than with the military clique who brought on the war but did not accept the final conditions of the peace. It would be fatal for the people of the world to regard their postwar misery as a product of their *coming* government rather than of their *past* governments.

d. Plans for a permanent peace. Here one treads dangerous ground. Plans now made cannot take into account the unpredictable events that will intervene before the war is over and before we know what conditions will prevail. As a result of a yet unpublished questionnaire study Stagner assures us that psychologists are in striking agreement about the desirability and feasibility of an international organization to include all nations, of restricting national sovereignty, of an international police force, and of limiting economic nationalism. These are sanguine commitments, and undoubtedly reflect the basic faith of psychologists in the modifiability of human nature. Psychologists are seldom pessimists. Left to themselves they have confidence in the plasticity of habits and attitudes. Since men learn

new identifications readily, why should not they identify with a world state (275)? They have already worked out methods of preventing fights between individuals—so why not between nations (83)? But a more pessimistic note is injected by those who argue in economic terms, seeing little hope for pacifistic training or for redirecting attitudes unless thoroughgoing changes are first effected in economic structure (114, 115, 187, 123).

It is certain that psychologists have only just begun to work on the conditions that are indispensable to a lasting peace. The work to be done involves much detail and much salesmanship. For example, psychologists know some of the pitfalls of committee and conference procedures. (So too do many other people, but it is up to the psychologists to formulate and articulate them.) We know that the personal tensions and double-dealing of the Versailles conference must be avoided (207). But where is there a psychological manual to take its place beside the Rules of Order, and help reduce the perils of unsound selection of personnel, policy, and procedure?

On a still broader scale, how shall psychologists convince peace-planners of a fact that psychologists know so well,—namely that *demands* can never resolve conflicts? Pressure groups from various nations each advocating a predetermined solution of boundary-disputes, of the balance of power, of economic tangles, can only struggle, quarrel, and compromise. Genuine integration (the discovery of a "final common path" to men's conflicts) can occur only if desires, wishes, needs, and hopes are examined without prejudging the means to their fulfillment. Demands, "terms," ultimata, are rigid and lead inevitably to power politics. When, however, root wishes and desires are expressed they are seldom found to be incompatible. Ways and means can often be invented for their full realization without the need for suppression or frustration. This, we recall, is the thought expressed in a classical essay in psychology —Holt's *Freudian Wish* (124). It is profoundly relevant to the world situation today. How shall it be told to the statesmen who will write the peace terms?

B. Conclusion

Lengthy as this review has been it is still incomplete. It has included too few reports from Britain and other United Nations, too

few from government services, and, of course, none from the armed forces or from the restricted files of *OWI, OSS,* and other wartime agencies. It may well be that the most important work that is being done is here unrepresented. Certainly this is true in the field of psychological warfare. Even civilian work is not adequately surveyed, for researches are multiplying at a bewildering rate, too rapidly for the War Service Committee to keep itself informed concerning them.

Many of the researches here reported may appear to be elaborations of the obvious. But the commonplaces of social life seem never to be fully appreciated by social scientists (nor accurately understood) until they are exemplified and formulated in the course of objective investigation. It seems inevitable that the focusing of research upon everyday problems with the end in view of making the results immediately applicable to the enhancement of social values, will engender good habits for the future. Social psychology will become less esoteric in its outlet, and more closely geared to application. The limit of this revolutionary trend cannot now be foreseen. But for a whole generation, at least, the mere fact that the majority of social psychologists have directly or indirectly worked for the government cannot fail to have a significant effect upon their outlook and upon their teaching. Just what proportion of social psychologists are in the armed forces or in government positions is not known, but that the percentage is large can be seen from the surveys made by Wolfle (302) and Britt (45).

Besides their formal and professional work for the war effort, social psychologists, by the very nature of their interests, are likely to be drawn into community service. Outside the classroom they lecture widely, assist local offices of Civilian Defense, write for popular consumption, direct rumor clinics, take on responsibilities in industry, in social agencies, in the public schools. A glimpse into these volunteer activities is given by various writers (5, 205, 47, 44).

The present survey has frequently strayed from the narrow confines of social psychology academically defined. But narrow definitions of social psychology, futile enough in peacetime, are obviously out of place in time of war. If the revolutionary changes that are taking place succeed in destroying the artificial boundaries that have been erected between various branches of psychology or between psychology and other sciences, there will probably be few mourners.

At the end of World War I Dodge made a plea for the full recognition of a discipline which he called "human engineering" which should bring all of psychology to bear upon the problems of public policy and social welfare (79). Dodge's plea, unheeded at the time, has been reiterated by Yerkes (304). Now psychologists, government officials, and the public at large are far more receptive. Three important organizations formed exclusively for the purpose of extending the practical service of psychology have come into being: The Emergency Committee in Psychology (75), the Office of Psychological Personnel (46, 48, 50), the National Council of Women Psychologists (276).

But the revolution is not yet accomplished. Still more portentious changes are under way. The desire to develop psychology as a profession devoted more explicitly to the advancement of social welfare was recognized in the deliberations of the Inter-society Constitutional Convention which met in May, 1943 (37, 38, 49). If the recommendations of this convention are accepted and put into effect by the psychological societies of the nation, we shall then have a guarantee that psychologists will carry over into peacetime the same profound sense of social responsibility that they have manifested in time of war.

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